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Background: In team games situations, the ability to make fast and accurate decisions is 22 
crucial to performance. As such, effective decision making, characterised by the consistent 23 
and efficient ability to choose the right course of action at the right moment, is a key 24 
component of match performance in team sports such as rugby union. Previous research has 25 
identified pedagogical approaches to enhance decision making. However, there is dearth in 26 
research to investigate how coaches evaluate tactical decision making and subsequently 27 
develop context specific ‘on’ and ‘off-field’ coaching practices to improve it. Further, the value 28 
coaches place on decision making is under explored. 29 
Purpose: The aim of this study was to explore coaches’ perceptions of decision making in 30 
rugby union. The specific objectives to meet this aim were to: i) Explore coaches’ perceptions 31 
of the value and importance of decision making in rugby union; ii) Identify coaches’ opinions 32 
of the key decision making moments in games and how to evaluate them; and iii) Investigate 33 
coaches’ on and off field methods for improving players’ tactical and strategic decision making 34 
Participants: Purposive sampling was used to select five male coaches, whose ages ranged 35 
from 25 to 41 years, from a regional rugby union club in Wales to participate in the study. 36 
Coaching experience ranged from two years to 16 years.  37 
Methods: The interpretative paradigm was used within the study with data collected through 38 
semi-structured interviews with academy rugby union coaches. This type of interview 39 
gathered rich, detailed and complex accounts of coaches’ opinions of players’ in-game 40 
decision making in rugby union in order to inform practice and theory. Inductive and 41 
deductive qualitative thematic analysis was used to analyse and interpret the data. 42 
Findings: All five coaches agreed that decision making was a crucial part of the modern game 43 
of rugby union. There was some disagreement between them about the players’ autonomy 44 
to make their own decisions on the pitch and a general lack of clarity between ‘game plan’, 45 
‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’ amongst the coaches. All the coaches agreed that the process of 46 
evaluation of players’ decision making should involve a joint discussion with the players. They 47 
also agreed that developing decision making was one of the hardest things to coach. Finally, 48 
they used a variety of ‘on’ and ‘off-field’ coaching methods to achieve this including video 49 
analysis, questioning and the use of games based scenarios. 50 
Conclusion: This study acquired the coaches’ voice on players’ decision making in rugby union 51 
by exploring its perceived importance to them and how they evaluated and attempted to 52 
improve it. A clear attempt was made among the coaches to develop a ‘non-judgemental’ 53 
atmosphere in the evaluation and improvement of players’ decision making. Future research 54 
should consider the use of explicitation interviewing, where the interviewer (coach) aims to 55 
get the player into a state of evocation, to relive the key decision making moments in an 56 




Key Words: Decision making, rugby union, coaching practice.  61 
3 
 
Introduction  62 
Team games are a source of uncertainty and unpredictability for the players (Passos, Araujo, 63 
Davids, & Shuttleworth, 2008). At regular moments during the game, players need to select 64 
the most appropriate response from a range of possible options to outwit the opposition, or 65 
achieve a specific goal (Abernethy, 1996; Grehaigne, Godbout, & Bouthier, 2001). In such 66 
complex situations, the ability to make fast and accurate decisions is crucial to performance 67 
(McGuckian, Cole, & Pepping, 2018). As such, effective decision making, characterised by the 68 
consistent and efficient ability to choose the right course of action at the right moment, is a 69 
key component of match performance in team sports such as rugby union (Grehaigne et al., 70 
2001).  71 
 Rugby, consistent with all team games, is considered to be a complex and constantly 72 
changing environment, composed of multiple components that require individual and context 73 
specific decisions (Passos et al., 2008). Factors such as time, score, situation on the field, and 74 
location of team mates and the opposition influence the decision-making process (O’Connor 75 
& Larkin, 2015). Being attuned to situation specific, perceptual information then, is the 76 
foundation for skilled decision making in rugby (Passos, et al., 2008).   77 
 In-game decision making in team sports such as rugby is dependent upon the 78 
technical, tactical and strategic demands of the evolving game-play (O’Connor & Larkin, 79 
2015). Bouthier (1988) and Mouchet (2014) differentiated between strategy and tactics. For 80 
them, strategy refers to the plan or action guidelines decided upon prior to the game, 81 
whereas tactics are voluntarily executed during the game in order to adapt spontaneously to 82 
the opposition and the requirements of the ever-changing situation. Similarly, according to 83 
Grehaigne and Godbout (1995, p. 491): 84 
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Strategy refers to the elements discussed in advance in order for the team to organise 85 
itself. Tactics are a punctual adaptation to new configurations of play and to the 86 
circulation of the ball; they are therefore an adaptation to the opposition. 87 
There is, therefore, a fundamental difference between strategy and tactics from a time-based 88 
perspective, with tactics operating under strong time constraints (Grehaigne, Godbout & 89 
Bouthier, 1999). During game play, especially for players near the ball, tactics are paramount 90 
since they are based on successive decisions taken according to the evolution of the game 91 
(Grehaigne et al., 1999).  92 
 Bouthier (1988), based on the work of Deleplace (1979), made a further distinction 93 
between the unfolding of a ‘set-play’ (static phase) and tactical decisions in unexpected 94 
(open/adaptive) play. He refers to a ‘set-play’ as a ‘schema of play’; a pre-established 95 
programme of actions, linked in a specific order and set in motion by a given signal (often 96 
referred to as a ‘set move’ in rugby). Tactics, on the other hand, build up during the action 97 
and alter the player’s perception according to the situation; ‘the player’s ‘own operating 98 
system during play’ (Grehaigne et al., 1999, p. 167). 99 
 Given the importance of good tactical decision making in team games such as rugby, 100 
researchers have sought to explore and identify the best strategies and learning 101 
environments for improving it (O’Connor, Larkin, & Williams, 2017). The use of inquiry-based 102 
approaches such as Game Sense (de Duyn, 1997) and Teaching Games for Understanding 103 
(Bunker & Thorpe, 1982) have been shown to enhance players’ decision making, strategic and 104 
tactical understanding (Light & Evans, 2010; Pill, 2012), although there is some confounding 105 
opinion about the meaning of strategy and tactics in these papers (Grehaigne et al., 1999).  106 
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Specific approaches to improve tactical decision making include the use of video-107 
based methods to enhance perceptual-cognitive processes (Starkes & Lindley, 1994). 108 
However, such methods have been criticised for having poor ecological validity, the extent to 109 
which the task replicates the natural game environment (McGuckian et al., 2018). In response 110 
to this criticism, more ecologically valid coaching approaches that take the interaction of the 111 
player and the environment into consideration, have been advocated in team sports 112 
(O’Connor et al., 2018). Such approaches include a greater focus on questioning and problem-113 
solving approaches to improve players’ ‘in the moment’ tactical decision making by 114 
stimulating players’ higher order thinking (Mouchet, 2015; Partington & Cushion, 2013) and 115 
are therefore favoured in this study. Other approaches used in rugby and other team games 116 
include the use of video in player meetings to facilitate player deconstruction and learning; 117 
video simulation combined with questioning around the available options; and game 118 
observation with predictions about the decisions players make (O’Connor & Larkin, 2015) 119 
Knowing how coaches understand decision making may provide useful insights for 120 
interventions to improve it (O’Connor, et al., 2018). Indeed, these authors argue that a logical 121 
and necessary first step in developing players’ tactical decision making is to understand how 122 
coaches perceive, value, and conceptualise it and how they attempt to create learning 123 
environments that improve it. In their recent article, they adopted a phenomenographic 124 
approach to examine how elite coaches conceptualise decision making and its development 125 
in association football. Phenomenography takes a second-order approach by evaluating 126 
people’s understanding of a phenomenon (Marton & Booth, 1997). This approach explores 127 
‘the different ways that individuals experience, interpret, understand, apprehend, perceive or 128 
conceptualise various aspect of reality’ (Marton, 1981, p. 178).  129 
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O’Connor et al. (2018) used semi-structured interviews to explore coaches’ 130 
conceptions of decision making in team games and its development in players. Their 131 
conceptions of decision making included players needing to predict what happens next, based 132 
on their game knowledge, and to collaborate with team mates both on and off the ball, in a 133 
constantly changing environment. Coaches’ conceptions of how decision making could be 134 
developed included: playing regularly with others; effective communication; balancing 135 
structure and autonomy; knowledgeable inspiration from other players and coaches; and a 136 
focus on improvement rather than winning. O’Connor et al.’s (2018) study is rich in insight 137 
into the pedagogical approaches to enhance decision making. However, how coaches 138 
evaluate tactical decision making and subsequently develop context specific ‘on’ and ‘off-139 
field’ coaching practices to improve it were not specifically identified. Further, whilst the 140 
findings on coaches’ conceptions of decision making were very informative, the value they 141 
placed on decision making was assumed and not explored. O’Connor et al. (2018), conclude 142 
by suggesting that further research is needed to answer the questions of how to better 143 
understand coaches’ perceptions of decision making and create an effective learning 144 
environment to promote it. In response to these questions, with the identified limitations of 145 
previous research in mind, the aim of the present study was to explore coaches’ perceptions 146 
of decision making in rugby union. The specific objectives to meet this aim were to: 147 
1. Explore coaches’ perceptions of the value and importance of decision making in rugby 148 
union; 149 
2. Identify coaches’ opinions of the key decision making moments in games and how to 150 
evaluate them; 151 
3. Investigate coaches’ on and off field methods for improving players’ tactical and 152 




To address the aim and objectives, the interpretive paradigm was used to underpin this 155 
research. It is an approach that has increasingly been applied to studies within the academic 156 
field of sports coaching (e.g. Purdy & Potrac, 2016; Thompson, Potrac, & Jones, 2015). 157 
Interpretive research is suited for exploring the complexity of the social world through 158 
studying individual experience and how sense is made of experiences and actions (Bryman, 159 
2012). It is a paradigm, which allows the researcher to gain deep insights into individual issues 160 
within social worlds constructed by interests, emotions and values (Sparkes, 1992).  The 161 
interpretative paradigm, therefore, was used within the study with data collected through 162 
semi-structured interviews with academy rugby union coaches. This type of interview 163 
gathered rich, detailed and complex accounts of coaches’ opinions of players’ in-game 164 
decision making in rugby union in order to inform practice and theory (Kvale & Brinkmann, 165 
2009). 166 
Participants  167 
All five male coaches, whose ages ranged from 25 to 41 years, from a regional rugby union 168 
academy in Wales were purposively selected to participate in the study. During the interview 169 
period the four coaches were responsible for coaching the academy teams (U18 and U16) 170 
while two of these individuals also had roles with the senior squad. The other coach was the 171 
Director of Rugby with overall responsibility for the senior squad and academy teams. 172 
Coaching experience ranged from one year to 16 years (see Table 1). Participants were 173 
selected as they consisted of all academy coaches at the region and were individuals who 174 
were knowledgeable about coaching rugby union at age grade level and the ‘cultural arena or 175 
experience’ to be studied (Rubin & Rubin, 1995, p.66). This allowed for the data gathered to 176 
be specific to the aim and objectives of the research (Patton, 2002). The coaches were 177 
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approached to participate through a ‘gatekeeper’ at the academy known to both researchers. 178 
The ethical implications of involvement in the project were discussed and consent obtained 179 
in relation to all participants. All coaches were reminded throughout the study that their 180 
involvement was voluntary and that they were free to withdraw at any time. The Ethics 181 
Committee at the host University approved the study’s protocols in this regard, while all the 182 
names used within this manuscript are pseudonyms. 183 
Insert Table 1. 184 
Procedure and method  185 
Each of the semi-structured individual interviews were audio-recorded and ranged between 186 
30 and 60 minutes. The interviews with Steve, Brian and John were conducted first and the 187 
following with Rob and Mark a week later both at the club’s training centre. The interviews, 188 
being semi-structured in nature, allowed the researchers to specify a framework of questions 189 
driven by the study’s aim and objectives whilst remaining free to probe beyond the immediate 190 
answers given. An interview guide was used by both interviewers based on themes emerging 191 
from the literature (Kvale & Brinkman, 2009), focused on: a) coaches’ opinions of the 192 
importance of player decision making; b) factors that influence tactical decision making; c) 193 
their understanding of game plan, strategy and tactics; d) how they evaluate decision making; 194 
and e) their on and off-field methods to improve it. Initial questions focused on coaching 195 
background and were open and general, allowing the participant to be descriptive and to 196 
build rapport. This also allowed the interviewer to demonstrate firm knowledge of the 197 
subject, which is essential in interviews with individuals’ to gain symmetry in the interview 198 
relationship, gain credibility and increase rapport (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009).  The more 199 
searching ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions were kept for later in the interview or for when it was an 200 
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appropriate time to ask (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2011). The data was stored securely in 201 
accordance with host University’s data storage procedures and the Data Protection Act 202 
(1998). 203 
Data analysis  204 
All interviews were transcribed verbatim by a professional transcriber to ensure a complete 205 
record of the data and coaches were given the opportunity to check the transcriptions. Initial 206 
deductive pre-coding of the data was conducted, based around the questions and key 207 
concepts from the decision making literature (Aurini, Heath, & Howells, 2016; Saldana, 2013) 208 
(e.g. how important is player in-game decision making in the modern game? What factors 209 
influence players’ decisions?). In the first coding cycle, several descriptive codes were 210 
identified under each of the pre-codes, to describe chunks of data in a way that captured the 211 
main essence of them (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014) (e.g. degree of importance; 212 
constraints on players’ decision making in games). Coded segments were then collected for 213 
more detailed second cycle coding by condensing and integrating the first cycle codes into 214 
broader and more coherent categories and themes (Aurini et al., 2016; Miles et al., 2014). 215 
Some of the themes and categories were similar to the pre-coded themes, but others were 216 
generated more inductively out of the data analysis (e.g. importance of decision making 217 
(similar to pre-coded theme); players’ autonomy to make decisions (inductive theme)).  218 
The criteria for judging this qualitative study is informed by a relativist position, where 219 
evaluation is considered through a list of characteristics as opposed to a preordained and 220 
universal standard (Sparkes & Smith 2009). This approach allows the readers to draw their 221 
own conclusions in terms of the quality of the research by considering characteristics such as; 222 
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the worthiness of the topic; the rigour applied in the collection and analysis of data; the 223 
credibility of the researchers; and the potential contribution of the work. 224 
Results and Discussion  225 
This section will present and discuss the results structured around the main themes and 226 
categories that were generated in the second cycle of coding, namely, the importance of 227 
player decision making and the factors that influence it, player autonomy to make decisions, 228 
inconsistency in coaches’ terminology, evaluating player decision making, and how to 229 
improve player decision making.  230 
Importance of player decision making and factors that influence it 231 
As suspected, but previously unsubstantiated in the research, all five coaches agreed that 232 
decision making was a crucial part of the modern game of rugby union with some suggesting 233 
that it was the most important element and what sets certain players apart from others, e.g., 234 
according to Rob: 235 
I think it’s probably the key area of the game, really—for me, anyway. Especially at the 236 
moment, everyone is getting physically as good as anyone else, really….I think what 237 
can set someone apart, is the ability to make decisions under pressure.  238 
The coaches were also in agreement that decision making was vital in all aspects of the game: 239 
It’s massively important. I think it affects every aspect of the game to be honest, not 240 
just attack and defence but even at set piece you know, even that individual at 241 
moments like a ball carrier going to ground and whether he presents the ball 242 
immediately or whether he takes another roll or how he falls. (John)  243 
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 There was a general acceptance among the coaches that players need to react to 244 
different decision making demands as the game develops, e.g., ‘the game is often about what 245 
they see and how they react to a changing picture’ (John), and a high value was placed upon 246 
‘players who can change the course of a game’ (Brian). Players’ ability to read situational 247 
factors in games was, therefore, an important consideration. 248 
 Two of the coaches in particular felt that there were certain areas of the pitch where 249 
decision-making became more important. As Brian suggested: ‘I think the elevations of 250 
alertness and decision making vary on the pitch in certain areas’. John agreed: 251 
Yes, I think the big areas are their 22 and your 22. When in your own 22 generally 252 
you’re looking to move up the field and you have a choice whether you kick or run, or 253 
carry, and then where do you kick, do you kick it off? Do you keep it on the field to 254 
contest the ball? And then when you get into their 22 obviously their defensive line is 255 
stronger because they don’t have anyone in the back field 256 
Although all the coaches agreed that ‘decision making is happening all the time’ 257 
(Steve) in games, there was also a consensus that there were key moments when it became 258 
more important to make good decisions. According to Brian, ‘the game is predominantly 259 
played in the unstructured phases, so your decision making has to be good in that environment 260 
[……] a heightened alertness is needed.’ John, suggested that there were certain stages of the 261 
game when decision making was more important: ‘it’s important to start well, you know, to 262 
leave your imprint on the game, and then obviously just before half time, if you can be clinical 263 
then it often helps the end of the game.’ Rob agreed and combined this with a focus on the 264 
area of the field: ‘You’re looking at time: What’s the time? You’re looking at the clock; you’re 265 
looking in the area of the field.’  266 
 According to Steve, the positioning of the opposition defence was also an important 267 
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factor to consider in the decision making process:  268 
I think it’s not so much areas of the field but the opportunities, so say if you’ve got – 269 
for example your outside half kicking in open play, are we kicking for kicking’s sake or 270 
are we looking at the back field and seeing where their wingers are?  271 
In addition, Mark felt that ‘decision-making gets a lot harder as the game goes on because 272 
you’re under fatigue.’ He went on to say:  273 
When you’re fresh, when your body’s not under fatigue it’s easier to make the right 274 
decision. When your body’s under more stress and fatigue, you’re less likely to think, 275 
and your body’s a lot slower, so your mind sort of follows it, I suppose. (Mark)  276 
 Further influences on players’ decision-making during games that the coaches 277 
identified were; players’ individual technical abilities; and the weather conditions. Mark gave 278 
an example of how he thought players’ self-awareness of their abilities impacted on their 279 
decisions:   280 
For example, we’ve got one player who makes the right decisions with regards to 281 
things like attacking kicks and stuff, but his kicking’s not very good, so sometimes, 282 
when it’s on his weak foot, because he’s not comfortable in his own ability to produce 283 
the kick it influences his decision.   284 
For this same coach, and the others, the weather and playing conditions also affected 285 
decision-making: 286 
The conditions, yeah. Obviously, we’re playing in Wales, and our block of games now 287 
is January and February, so the weather’s going to be poor; it’s going to be wet and 288 
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windy and cold……and the surfaces we play on - you have to sort of completely change 289 
your game plan, based on where you’re playing and the pitch conditions. 290 
The findings on the importance of player decision making adds a new perspective to 291 
the research of Grehaigne et al. (2001) by gaining the coaches’ voice, something that has been 292 
missing in previous research. Having the coaches’ perceptions is important so that 293 
researchers do not simply assume the importance of decision making. In congruence with 294 
O’Connor & Larkin (2015), factors such as time, score, situation on the field, and location of 295 
team mates and the opposition were considered by the coaches to influence the decision 296 
making process. In addition to the findings of previous research, the coaches identified the 297 
impact of the prevailing weather and playing surface conditions as important factors in 298 
players’ in-game decision making. Further, new knowledge was generated around the 299 
importance of the players’ individual technical abilities and their level of fatigue at different 300 
times during the game in the decision making process. These last two factors have significant 301 
implications for the development of players’ technical skills through the use of pedagogies 302 
that place them ‘under pressure’ in game related situations (Light, Harvey, & Mouchet, 2014) 303 
and the design of training sessions to replicate the levels of fatigue that players experience in 304 
games.  305 
Player autonomy to make decisions 306 
There was some disagreement between the coaches about the players’ autonomy to make 307 
their own decisions on the pitch. When John, the director of rugby, was asked about whether 308 
there were constraints placed on the players to make decisions by the coaches, he replied, 309 
‘We try not to (set constraints). We try to give them the freedom to express themselves and I 310 
think that’s important for them.’ However, Brian, the most experienced coach, disagreed and 311 
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favoured a more structured approach where players were coached to play within a relatively 312 
tight framework and game plan: 313 
I think there will always be constraints obviously because it depends on if you’ve got a 314 
framework and 90% of the people are working to a framework, there again if people 315 
make individual decisions within that framework of course that is key.  But for example 316 
if 3 or 4 are going off on different things, then what it does to everybody else, it causes 317 
a complete mish-mash, with me going well I know at this point in time I want to give a 318 
pass to somebody else. But where were you?  Where’ve you gone? Kind of thing. 319 
Steve, who was still playing at the time of the interviews, fell between these two opinions, 320 
suggesting that: 321 
I think there are a few little constraints sometimes, so we try to limit them as much as 322 
possible, but you do give them certain boundaries [……] during a kicking battle we 323 
always said if you can get back to the halfway line by running it, then keep the ball. If 324 
you can’t get to the halfway line, then look to kick for territory or kick to regain, so that 325 
is a sort of constraint.  326 
These findings provide new knowledge around coaches’ perceptions about the level 327 
of control they have over their players’ decision making in training and during games, and the 328 
dialectical relationship between structure and agency in team game. Empowering the players 329 
by providing them with choices and a sense of ownership over the tasks they are participating 330 
in is believed by some to enable them to feel a greater level of autonomy, resulting in greater 331 
tactical and technical understanding and higher levels of commitment and motivation 332 
(Kidman, 2001; Light 2004). However, others have argued that empowerment is more of an 333 
illusion created by the coach to ‘orchestrate’ the environment, and that shared leadership is 334 
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more of a realistic portrayal of the coach-athlete relationship (Jones & Standage, 2006; Jones 335 
& Wallace, 2006; Santos, Jones, & Mesquita, 2013). Such shared leadership was alluded to by 336 
the coaches in this study, particularly Brian and Steve in the aforementioned quotes above 337 
which implied a level of collaboration between coaches and players, where a framework or 338 
boundary was set by the coaches but the players had a level of autonomy to choose options 339 
within it (Jones & Standage, 2006).    340 
Despite some of the coaches claiming that they tried not to control the players’ 341 
decision making in games, clearly there is a need for players to act in an individual way that 342 
others can make sense of and react to effectively, to maximise the emerging opportunity and 343 
outwit the opposition. This relates well to collaborative creativity (Sawyer, 2012). Drawing on 344 
Sawyer’s principles of collaborative creativity, based on mutual understanding and 345 
participation, and Seddon’s (2005) concept of emphatic attunement in jazz, Santos and 346 
Morgan (2019), argued that team games players can be coached to creatively support and 347 
react to each other’s in-game actions. However, in order to successfully achieve this, ideally, 348 
there should to be mutual understanding of strategy and tactics (Bouthier, 1988), something 349 
that was not fully evident in this study as revealed in the next section. 350 
Inconsistency in coaches’ terminology 351 
There was a general lack of clarity between ‘game plan’, ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’ amongst the 352 
coaches in this study. For example, according to Steve, ‘We have basic game plans, the way 353 
we want to play, for example we played [……] who are traditionally a big pack of forwards, so 354 
we worked out a pretty decent plan.’ This interpretation was very similar to Brian’s 355 
understanding of strategy: ‘You have a strategy which you have applied in readiness for a 356 
particular game or a particular opposition’ (Brian). For others, however, strategy was more 357 
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specific than game plan, e.g., ‘For us we’d obviously try and develop a good strategy for the 358 
game and that would help hopefully to give the players some strong information on where the 359 
space or opportunities might lie.’ (John) 360 
Similarly, there was ambiguity and disagreement over the meaning of ‘tactics’. For 361 
example, Mark asked: ‘Tactical, would that be game plan decision-making? Is that what you 362 
mean?’ Similarly, Steve gave a definition of tactics that sounded more like an overall game 363 
plan: 364 
A specific tactic of that was that we didn’t want to kick the ball out off the field, 365 
because they’ve got a big maul, so we wanted to keep the ball in play as long as 366 
possible and limit the number of line-outs we gave them to stop them getting a driving 367 
game going. 368 
 The inconsistency around the coaches’ understanding and use of decision making 369 
terminology is a new finding in this area of research and was further emphasised when they 370 
were specifically asked if they saw a difference between the terms ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’. This 371 
led to various responses, such as: ‘Not really, I know there’s a difference in words, but it 372 
depends on how you look at the words, how you perceive it. For me, they're very similar I 373 
think.’ (Brian), and then later in the same interview: ‘So this is my strategy beforehand, then 374 
tactically within the game, we need to adapt stuff.’ Other coaches were also unsure, e.g. ‘No, 375 
not really. Just taking them literally, strategical and tactical you can take what you want out 376 
of them. Tactical decision-making, would that be kind of on the go, maybe?’ (Rob), and 377 
similarly from Mark: ‘Oh okay. Strategic decision-making and tactical decision-making. I think 378 
it sort of all just comes under one bracket.’ 379 
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 Despite a lack of consistency in their used terminology of strategy and tactics, the 380 
coaches did seem to understand the need for, and the different demands placed upon the 381 
players by, pre-planned ‘set moves’ and ‘in the moment’ decision making. Pre-planned moves 382 
were commonly used by all the coaches, in addition to different options that players could 383 
decide upon within the moment of the game depending on the opposition. For example: ‘We 384 
run certain starts of plays, which are all pre-planned, but then they have different options off 385 
them, so it’s up to the players running the lines to make those decisions.’ (Mark).  386 
 Regarding Bouthier (1988) and Mouchet ‘s (2014) definitions of strategy and tactics, 387 
therefore, coaches were not clear on the differences in terminology but in practice they were 388 
seemingly able to differentiate between them. On the face of it, this may appear perfectly 389 
acceptable but this lack of consistency in the language used by the coaches amongst 390 
themselves and with the players has potential to cause confusion in player learning and 391 
decision making and inconsistency in coaching approaches to improve it. For example, if 392 
coaches use the word tactics to represent both ‘pre-planned’ moves and ‘in the moment’ 393 
adaptations to the opposition, then players may not understand the different demands on 394 
their own operating system (Grehaigne et al., 1999), or the need to develop it accordingly. 395 
Further, given that different coaches often work with the same team, inconsistency in their 396 
language is likely to cause confusion in the players’ minds and limit their learning.   397 
Evaluating player decision making  398 
All the coaches agreed that the process of evaluation of players’ decision making should 399 
involve a joint discussion with the players. In the words of Steve:  400 
It’s important to have a one-to-one conversation post-game, see why they made that 401 
decision, because I think you have to enter their mind, their brain, if you like. That to 402 
me is very much the relationship building that you have to have with a player and the 403 
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confidence they have with you about being able to have conversations and being 404 
comfortable in those conversations. 405 
Verbalising the general consensus of all the coaches, he went on to talk about being 406 
‘accepting of their thoughts’ and ‘creating a safe environment for the players’ and was 407 
adamant that ‘me constantly giving them the answer will never work long-term for helping 408 
the decision making process when they play the game.’ He also felt that ‘it’s difficult to say 409 
whether the decision is right or wrong until you ask them […..] I think that’s really important’. 410 
The co-construction of knowledge through the use of questioning, by the coach as the more 411 
knowledgeable other (Vygotsky, 1978) was, therefore, a key feature of these shared 412 
evaluation sessions as demonstrated by Mark:  413 
With the reviews I do, I’ll just question the players, not just what they’ve done bad, but 414 
when they make a good decision as well. “What makes this a good decision? Why have 415 
you passed? Why have you carried? What’s helped you to do that?  416 
Such ‘Why’? questions, despite good intentions, can be perceived as judgemental by the 417 
interviewee (Mouchet, Morgan, & Thomas, 2018). In contrast, Mouchet et al. (2018) suggest 418 
the use of explicitation type questioning, first developed by Vermersch (1994) as a form of 419 
introspection, preferring questions that begin with ‘How’ and ‘What’.  420 
 There was a strong reliance amongst all of the coaches on performance analysis in the joint 421 
evaluation process and on reviewing the decisions made in games with the players using video 422 
technology:  423 
I sort of do it (the evaluation of decision making) as more of a discussion with the 424 
players while showing them on the screen what we’ve recorded from various 425 
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different angles. Without technology, it would be a lot more difficult to review and  426 
talk about……..We’re lucky all our games get filmed at different angles, so you can  427 
see things that perhaps you wouldn’t see while you’re watching the game live or if  428 
you only have one angle. We’ve got an end-on view and three or four different angles  429 
sometimes, so we can see things from a different perspective. (Mark) 430 
Despite this pervading technology culture and the fact that all of the coaches were 431 
required to use it, Rob, expressed some personal concerns about the over reliance on it: ‘I’m 432 
not really stats-based at all. I kind of would like to back my own decision, really.’  This 433 
highlighted different perspectives amongst the coaches about their reliance on performance 434 
analysis technology to evaluate players’ decision making.  435 
 The criteria the coaches used to evaluate whether a decision was successful or not 436 
was primarily based on outcome, as Mark identified: 437 
The players know that we’re trying to score, first of all; secondly, we’re trying to break 438 
the line; thirdly, we’re just trying to go forward; and, fourth, we’re just trying to keep 439 
hold of the ball. They sort of know themselves. 440 
However, there was also a consensus amongst the coaches that the outcome wasn’t always  441 
the best way of evaluating successful decisions, as exemplified by Brian: 442 
Maybe the outcome is wrong, but it’s what the process is in their mind…..So the 443 
outcome becomes last almost because sometimes we put – oh yes, we scored the try 444 
or we made a 50-60 metre break, but was there a better option?  445 
The coaches, therefore, had different criteria for evaluating the success of player decisions. 446 
Brian, who was a ‘skills coach’, set skill specific criteria for some in-game decisions. For 447 
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example, in relation to ‘off-loading’ a quick pass out of contact situations, he would get the 448 
players to think about criteria such as, ‘Can I get my hands free to reach towards the player?  449 
Can I see the player?  If you can’t see the player then that offload shouldn’t be thrown.’ 450 
Similarly, from a defensive perspective Rob identified that: ‘The decision making is who goes 451 
low, who goes high, and where you set up, opposite’. This made the evaluation of decision 452 
making more objective and easier to observe and evaluate for coaches and players. 453 
 The coaches also had different experiences in identifying and agreeing upon the 454 
criteria for successful decisions with the other coaches. According to Steve, ‘You discuss it 455 
with the other coaches especially as it aligns with the strategy and tactics in a particular game 456 
or in a particular moment.’ However, John said, ‘No, it’s down to individuals’ and Rob agreed, 457 
stating that ‘No, it’s just me and the guy who helps me with my stats.’ Furthermore, even 458 
when coaches did get together to do a joint review and evaluation, there was not always 459 
agreement as, in the words of Steve: 460 
It comes down to individual perceptions. So I may say ‘he should have passed the ball’ 461 
and another coach may say ‘No, I think it was the right decision because if you looked 462 
at it, did you see this or this?  463 
In such circumstances, John suggested that, ‘As head coach I take the lead on it. So if I say, 464 
this is the kind of outcomes we are looking for, this is how we can get there then that generally 465 
leads the way.’ This demonstrated a type of power hierarchy amongst the coaching staff when 466 
it came to setting the criteria for successful in-game decisions by the players. 467 
 The coaches were in general agreement that their judgement of decision making 468 
success was primarily based on their own previous or current playing and coaching 469 
experiences, as Brian suggested, ‘From a coach’s perspective it’s probably the experiences 470 
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you’ve gained over the years.  You can probably see the picture as it’s unfolding [….] I have 471 
that information in my mind.’  John concurred, stating that ‘basically it’s my experience of the 472 
game and hopefully explaining to them what I would like to happen and what cue they should 473 
be looking for.’ This suggests that having playing experience, to at least the level they were 474 
coaching at, was considered important by both coaches and players in this particular coaching 475 
environment.   476 
 Finally, in relation to evaluation, there was an awareness amongst the coaches that 477 
decision making ‘off the ball’, as well as on it, was a crucial aspect to consider. In the words 478 
of Steve: 479 
That’s another big decision-making issue, trying to get people to communicate – see 480 
where the space is quickly, see what the picture is and it might not be the guy who’s 481 
actually got the ball – we're trying to get outside players to see space, communicate it 482 
and then let that guy make his own decision. 483 
             Most decision-making research to date has focused on the person in possession of the 484 
ball. Concentrating on ‘off the ball’ decision makers would link well with collaborative 485 
creativity (Sawyer, 2014) where players develop mutual understanding to read each other’s 486 
moves and are emphatically attuned to anticipate the best option to continue the emergent 487 
play (Seddon, 2005; Santos & Morgan, 2019). Such an approach would build upon O’Connor 488 
et al.’s (2018) conception of decision making which included players’ abilities to predict what 489 
happens next and to collaborate with team mates both on and off the ball, in a constantly 490 
changing environment. 491 
 The findings in relation to the process of how to evaluate players’ decision making, 492 
outside of the game situation were closely associated with the earlier discussion around 493 
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shared leadership in decision making, which promotes athlete choice within limits identified 494 
by the coach (Jones & Standage, 2006). In such situations, athletes can be considered 495 
relatively autonomous, but still influenced by the coach, as the more knowledgeable other 496 
(Vygotsky, 1978), who sets the boundaries within which the athletes are allowed to partake 497 
(Jones & Standage, 2006).  498 
 The judgemental aspect of ‘Why’ questions, as opposed to the use of ‘What’ and ‘How’ 499 
type questions promoted in explicitation style interviewing is an important consideration for 500 
evaluating and developing player decision making (Mouchet et al., 2018). This type of 501 
questioning involves finding information in oneself that is largely invisible until it has been 502 
brought into reflective consciousness by the interviewer. However, coaches would need to 503 
be specifically trained in this interviewing technique to use it effectively with players in both 504 
off and on-field situations (Mouchet et al., 2018). 505 
 Consistent with the findings of O’Connor and Larkin (2016), there was a strong reliance 506 
amongst all of the coaches on performance analysis in the evaluation process and on 507 
reviewing the decisions made in games with the players using video technology. Given the 508 
dominance of this type of video analysis in all invasion games sports nowadays, exploring how 509 
this impacts on the coaches’ confidence in their own abilities to make ‘in the moment’ 510 
evaluations about players’ decisions, previously considered as an important coaching skill and 511 
part of the ‘craft of coaching’ (Mouchet & Duffy, 2018), is an interesting area for future 512 
research. Further, the difficulty in accurately evaluating player decision making, where the 513 
outcome needs to be assessed in terms of the effect of the decision made and the execution 514 
of skills, is not to be underestimated and further research is required in this important area.   515 
How to improve player decision making 516 
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The coaches all agreed that developing decision making was difficult, In Rob’s words: ‘I think 517 
it’s one of the hardest things to try to coach really, because there is so many other intangibles 518 
going on, there’s so much information to try to make a player a good decision maker.’ The 519 
following sub-sections identify how they attempted to do this using both on and off-field 520 
coaching methods. 521 
On-field coaching approaches: All of the coaches agreed that training to 522 
improve decision making needed to move away from traditional ‘drill based’ sessions to  523 
‘games based’ scenarios, as identified by Steve: 524 
We don’t train much on specific moves or specific set plays, a lot of it is down to 525 
creating rugby chaos, and then putting boys into repeated situations where we’ve got 526 
a framework but it’s down to the players then to choose which option they want to 527 
run, especially in attack. 528 
The rationale for this change was based on the previous failure of ‘drill based’ sessions to 529 
develop learning and independent decision makers in games. As John put it:  530 
When we go to club rugby sessions, you still see them doing drills for drills’ sake and 531 
kids aren’t really responding, they're not making decisions, they're just doing a drill 532 
because they’ve been told to do a drill. Whereas they need to learn, and that’s where 533 
a lot of small sided games come in – it builds their experience bank because if you get 534 
lots of repetitions in small-sided games where they haven’t got someone telling them 535 
specifically to do certain things all the time, they’ve got to react and do it themselves.  536 
However, there was an acknowledgement by some of the coaches that this ‘chaotic  537 
approach wasn’t always easy to implement in practice, which might put coaches off using it: 538 
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It’s a difficult one because your training session sometimes looks a mess. For me, when 539 
I first started doing it, unless we had 100 percent success, I’d think I was doing 540 
something wrong or it was too hard, but I’ve sort of just grown to realize that it’s okay 541 
to have a mess. (Mark) 542 
However, despite these challenges, the coaches agreed that putting players under pressure 543 
to replicate game situations was key to developing their decision making, as Mark verbalised: 544 
‘The stuff we do in training, like playing from everywhere and putting teams under pressure, 545 
we felt it really did show when we played games.’ This increase in pressure, however, came 546 
with a greater risk of injury as acknowledged by Steve: ‘It’s hard, especially at this level to 547 
replicate too much pressure, because obviously there’s the risk of injury.’  The pressure theme 548 
was also closely associated with fatigue by Steve and Mark in particular. In the words of Steve: 549 
‘Everyone makes good decisions, everyone executes good skills when you're 100% fresh and 550 
not under pressure. Under pressure of fatigue and under pressure of defence is when you learn 551 
how to execute them.’  552 
There was a definite move within this group of coaches to focus more on questioning 553 
the players about their decision-making during training sessions, rather than telling them 554 
what they should do. As Steve put it: ‘We’ve come up with this philosophy called ‘No tell’ so 555 
we’re not allowed to tell players certain feedback of what we think they’ve done wrong or 556 
what they should be doing.’ The value of this type of questioning approach, according to the 557 
coaches, was to get the players to think more about their decisions, as John suggested: ‘You 558 
pose a question on the pitch and then we all work from there and I can definitely see players, 559 
when it gets to that point in time, they're thinking ‘I'm on it.’  They're subconsciously thinking 560 
about it.’  Steve explained this in more detail, whilst acknowledging his own fallibility and that 561 
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it is a difficult thing to do as a coach: 562 
it’s quite hard as a coach because you’ve got to do a lot of role play, ask questions and 563 
try to get a level of understanding out of them.  But it is interesting because if you can 564 
try to get them to think, about those decisions they’ve made and if they could do it 565 
next time, what could I possibly do better?  What possibly could I do differently, 566 
without me going ‘You should have done this.’  Because me telling him he should have 567 
done this doesn’t really help that player grow, and I could also be wrong. 568 
 All of the coaches agreed with the necessity of players making mistakes in training 569 
sessions to improve decision-making, as exemplified by John:  570 
I think its important that we create the type of environment in training so that they 571 
feel that they can try things, but also do the skill blocks to try and make sure they have 572 
the skill to do it. 573 
Mark agreed, providing more of a rationale: 574 
Yeah, uncertainty of failure. We talk about building failure into training. Uncertainty, 575 
we’ll throw in different balls. We’ll go from playing with a rugby ball to a football all 576 
of a sudden, which starts as chaos, and you’ve got to deal with a lot of error. Because 577 
you’ve got to have some sort of failure in order for you to learn. 578 
This approach is related to ‘differential learning’ which uses random variability in allowing 579 
players to acquire new and functional movement patterns and unleash their creativity 580 
(Santos, Coutinho, Gonçalves, Schöllhorn, Sampaio, & Leite, 2018). Within the differential 581 
learning approach, players are instructed to actively perform movement errors, instead of  582 
avoiding them, to promote constant adaptations (Santos, et al., 2018). However, it is worth 583 
reminding ourselves that these coaches were working in a Development Academy 584 
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environment, as Mark alluded to: ‘It’s nice to win, but we’re not too bothered about that. 585 
We’re bothered about producing the next professional player, so if they’re making mistakes 586 
but learning from them, then that’s okay […..] mistakes are okay; that’s how you learn.’  587 
This focus on improvement rather than winning was similar to the findings of 588 
O’Connor et al.’s, (2018) research with elite senior and youth soccer coaches in Australia. 589 
However, such a luxury, of not being overly dependent for one’s professional security based 590 
on the results of games, is not common amongst professional senior sport coaches in the 591 
modern era. Indeed, it could be argued that this may be one of the main reasons why coaches 592 
revert to tried and tested methods of coaching instead of becoming more adventurous and 593 
creative in their coaching practice.  594 
The ‘on field’ approaches adopted by this group of coaches were consistent with the 595 
use of inquiry based approaches such as Game Sense (de Duyn, 1997) and Teaching Games 596 
for Understanding (Bunker & Thorpe, 1982). Indeed, the emphasis in training on whole game 597 
situations, where players attempted to manage chaos and disorder in the face of opposition 598 
to make ‘at-action’ decisions, is closely associated with Light et al.’s (2014) promotion of 599 
Game Sense pedagogy and complex learning theory (CLT) to improve player decision making.   600 
 Off-field coaching methods: All of the coaches relied heavily on the use of  601 
post-game video analysis to attempt to improve players’ decisions. The primary purpose of  602 
the video was to remind the players of key decision making moments in the game and to  603 
promote discussion with them to enhance it. As John reflected: 604 
We support it with video, if they don’t remember it, if its vague or lacking clarity or if 605 
they have a different point of view, you use the footage to reinforce the message. Not 606 
just to reinforce my thoughts, it’s to have further discussion. 607 
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Consistent with the ‘on-field’ methods to improve decision making, the off-field 608 
approaches also stressed a shared ‘no tell’ questioning philosophy amongst most of the 609 
coaches in 1-1 weekly review meetings. These individual review meetings with the players 610 
tended to last about 15 minutes and the coaches asked questions such as:  611 
What could we be doing here? What else is on? What other options have you got?  To 612 
try to get them to realise ‘Oh, yes I could have done this’, or ‘I haven’t looked’ and to 613 
realise their mistakes – ‘I haven’t checked what’s in front of me, I've done it for the 614 
sake of doing it. (Steve)  615 
The rationale for this type of off-field retrospective questioning was to attempt to get players 616 
to ‘relive that moment’. As John identified:  617 
I think it’s just trying to get them to recollect as much as they can you know. So what 618 
part of the field was it in? Who was on your inside? On your outside? Because we know 619 
all our position aims so, what was X doing in defence? Who was covering? To see if 620 
they can remember, you know. 621 
This approach has a strong connection with the explicitation technique already alluded to in 622 
this paper (Mouchet, et al., 2018), where the interviewer (coach) aims to get the player into 623 
a state of evocation, to relive the key decision making moments in an attempt to improve 624 
future decision making opportunities.  625 
A crucial element of these meetings was getting the players to ‘open-up’ and be 626 
honest with the coaches, as Brian mentioned:  627 
‘That to me is very much the relationship building that you have to have with a player 628 
and the confidence they have with you about being able to have conversations and 629 
being comfortable in those conversations……knowing that it’s a safe environment’,  630 
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This was easier for some coaches than others, depending on their role within the club. John, 631 
for example, was the head coach and director of rugby and openly admitted that: 632 
I think they are more likely to be honest with him (Brian the skills coach). Because I’m 633 
head coach and because I decide their contract, their future, their selection …. I think 634 
that someone a little bit further down who’s not involved in selection can get much 635 
better honesty and more interaction……Certainly for me, when I played I would always 636 
try and give the coach the answer he wanted. 637 
That said, the overwhelming opinion of this group of coaches was that it is crucial to listen to 638 
the players perspective in relation to their decision making in games: 639 
I just sit with the player and just basically let them describe to me what their thought 640 
process was and why they made that decision. Is it somebody else making the call? Is 641 
it what they can see? If they’re making what I perceive to be the wrong call, then how 642 
do we go about changing that? (Mark)  643 
 Other, more innovative, off-field methods that the coaches mentioned to improve 644 
players’ decision making were based on game scenarios that the players had to find and 645 
present solutions to on the ‘whiteboard’ in the classroom, as Mark explained: 646 
We’ll organize the boys into small groups and they’ll have tasks that involve analysis 647 
most of the time. They have to go away and look at the clips or they’ll have to come 648 
up with ideas based on a scenario we set. It might be, that we upload clips of our attack 649 
in the game before and ask the halfbacks and backfield players and fullbacks to come 650 
up with the things we did well, present back to the group. 651 
 The coaches also encouraged players to watch more rugby games and discuss key 652 
tactical and strategic decisions with other players (Brian). Such player discussions were seen 653 
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as a valuable learning tool: ‘Sometimes we just sit back and listen, and they discuss between 654 
themselves with some disagreements. That’s good; that’s what we want. For me, that’s 655 
healthy for them to be doing.’ (Brian).  Finally, peer coaching was another method adopted 656 
by some of the coaches to develop learning of the younger and more inexperienced players 657 
in particular by using the more experienced players as mentors. 658 
The peer to peer thing is very important.  There’s a player here who does it with the 659 
young players, that’s – talk to the young player or sit with him watching the games. 660 
Those things are gold, really. (Brian)  661 
             These ‘off field’ approaches are similar to those found to be prominent in team games 662 
by O’Connor and Larkin (2015) and are now commonplace in professional sport. Consistent 663 
with the work of O’Connor et al. (2018), and Partington and Cushion (2013), there was a 664 
definite move within this group of coaches to focus more on questioning. However, the use 665 
of questioning among this group of coaches provides an interesting insight into the power 666 
dynamic between them and players, revealing that, despite the language and rhetoric around 667 
empowerment, there is still an overriding feeling that the final answer lies with the coach and 668 
that it is his duty to get the players to see that perspective. Indeed, in this context the coach 669 
is (or perhaps should be) viewed as ‘the more capable other’ (Vygotksy, 1978) mediating the 670 
players’ learning using shared language and ‘psychological tools’ through performance 671 
analysis and questioning. Further, the specific role of the coach had important implications 672 
for the players when it came to ‘opening up’ and revealing their decision making weaknesses. 673 
Not surprisingly, they were more comfortable in doing this with the skills coach than the head 674 
coach and director of rugby who had greater power in the selection process for games and in 675 




The aim of this study was to acquire the coaches’ voice on players’ decision making in rugby 678 
union by exploring its perceived importance to them and how they evaluated and attempted 679 
to improve it. In doing so, this study addressed a gap in the decision making literature and 680 
provided a basis for further research on how to enhance it in coaching practice.  681 
Some interesting findings revealed differences in coaching philosophy within the 682 
group. Certain coaches, particularly those in more senior leadership roles, preferred more 683 
control and structure, whereas others adopted a more autonomy supportive and shared 684 
leadership approach with the players. This alludes to what Jones and Standage (2006) refer 685 
to as an uneasy interplay between coaches’ use of power, in accordance with their beliefs 686 
about their hierarchy of accountability and athlete’s autonomy. Whilst these differences are 687 
probably to be expected amongst any group of coaches, they have implications for the 688 
consistency of messages to the players and the resultant coaching approaches employed to 689 
improve decision making. The results also showed an inconsistency in the terminology used 690 
by the coaches for strategy and tactics compared to their definitions in previous research 691 
(Bouthier, 1988; Mouchet, 2014). Developing a more consistent coaching language and 692 
improving coaches’ knowledge and understanding of these concepts would seem to be an 693 
important implication for player learning, as without such consistency the concept formation 694 
of the players will not be optimised (Vygotsky, 1978).    695 
Consistent with the explicitation technique (Mouchet, et al., 2018) a clear attempt was 696 
made amongst the coaches in this study to develop a ‘non-judgemental’ atmosphere in the 697 
video analysis sessions used to evaluate and improve players’ decision making. This has 698 
important implications for coaching practice and future research should explore the use of 699 
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explicitation interviewing by researchers and coaches to enhance players’ decision making.  700 
The use of only five rugby coaches from the same academy, interviewed on one 701 
occasion, is a limitation of this paper and further research should increase the sample and 702 
explore coaches’ perceptions of decision making in different contexts and sports.  703 
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